


[ISUME, CTU Prague, May 2, 2011 ]

## What's the point of modelling uncertainty in engineering? Optimal decision making under uncertainty

**Daniel Straub**

Engineering Risk Analysis Group  
TU München




Technische Universität München



## What is the value of a probabilistic analysis?

- Probabilistic analysis provides a more accurate description of the system
- For engineers, this is not an inherent benefit
- The improved system description might support the identification of better engineering solutions
- This is the benefit


### A basic engineering problem



3

### A basic engineering problem

$$E[C|Design = i] = \Pr(F|Design = i) c_F + c_i$$




4

## A basic engineering problem

$$E[C|Design = i] = \Pr(F|Design = i) c_F + c_i$$

- Basic failure definition:  $F = \{R \leq S\}$



5

## A basic engineering problem

$$E[C|Design = i] = \Pr(F|Design = i) c_F + c_i$$

$$\Pr(F|Design = i) = \Phi\left(-\frac{\mu_{R_i} - \mu_S}{\sqrt{\sigma_{R_i}^2 + \sigma_S^2}}\right)$$

---

Mean and standard deviation of the load

$$\mu_S = 100\text{kN}, \sigma_S = 25\text{kN}$$

Mean and standard deviation of the capacity for design A

$$\mu_{R_A} = 300\text{kN}, \sigma_{R_A} = 45\text{kN}$$

Mean and standard deviation of the capacity for design B

$$\mu_{R_B} = 300\text{kN}, \sigma_{R_B} = 30\text{kN}$$

Acceptable probability of failure

$$p_F^T = 10^{-4}$$


---

6

**Design A is the optimal choice  
(as identified with a probabilistic analysis)**

$$a_p = \arg \min_{i=A,B} E[C|Design = i]$$

$$\text{subject to } \Pr(F|Design = i) \leq p_F^T$$

$$E[C|Design = A] = 1.05 \cdot 10^{-3}$$

$$E[C|Design = B] = 1.10 \cdot 10^{-3}$$

7

**The alternative is a  
deterministic code-based approach**

- Select the cheapest design complying with the code:

$$a_d = \arg \min_{i=A,B} c_i$$

$$\text{subject to } \underbrace{\gamma_S S_k}_{\text{Code criterion}} \leq \frac{R_{ik}}{\gamma_R}$$

Code criterion

8

### The alternative is a deterministic code-based approach

- Select the cheapest design complying with the code:

$$a_d = \arg \min_{i=A,B} c_i$$

$$\text{subject to } \gamma_S S_k \leq \frac{R_{ik}}{\gamma_R}$$

---

Partial safety factor for loads	$\gamma_S = 1.5$
Partial safety factor for capacity	$\gamma_R = 1.3$
Characteristic values for loads	$S_k = \mu_S$
Characteristic values for capacities	$R_{ik} = \mu_{R_i} - 1.64\sigma_{R_i}$

---

9

### The alternative is a deterministic code-based approach

- Select the cheapest design complying with the code:

$$a_d = \arg \min_{i=A,B} c_i$$

$$\text{subject to } \gamma_S S_k \leq \frac{R_{ik}}{\gamma_R}$$



Code criterion

- Both comply → Design A is selected

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### **The probabilistic analysis provides no benefit in this case**

- Both analyses lead to the same design
- Conditional value of information (CVI) of the probabilistic analysis is zero

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### **Value of information conditional on different design situations**

- Same design options A and B
- Loading environment can change: Vary  $\mu_\zeta$  and  $\sigma_\zeta (= 0.25\mu_\zeta)$

12

## Value of information conditional on different design situations

- Same design options A and B
- Loading environment can change: Vary  $\mu_S$  and  $\sigma_S (= 0.25\mu_S)$
- For given  $M_S = \mu_S$ , find the optimal design

- according to the deterministic analysis:
 
$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} a_d = \arg \min_{i=A,B} c_i \\ \text{subject to } \gamma_S S_k \leq \frac{R_{ik}}{\gamma_R} \end{array} \right.$$
- according to the probabilistic analysis:
 
$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} a_p = \arg \min_{i=A,B} E[C | Design = i] \\ \text{subject to } \Pr(F | Design = i) \leq p_F^T \end{array} \right.$$

13

## Value of information conditional on different design situations

The conditional value of information is:

$$CVI(\mu_S) = E[C | Design = a_d \cap M_S = \mu_S] - E[C | Design = a_p \cap M_S = \mu_S]$$

Expected cost with  
deterministic design

Expected cost with  
probabilistic design

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## Value of information conditional on different design situations

The conditional value of information is:


$$CVI(\mu_S) = E[C|Design = a_d \cap M_S = \mu_S] - E[C|Design = a_p \cap M_S = \mu_S]$$

Expected cost with  
deterministic design

Expected cost with  
probabilistic design



- The CVI cannot be negative!



15




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### Value of information of the probabilistic analysis

- The value of information is the expected value of the CVI with respect to all possible design situations:

$$VI = \int_{M_S} CVI(\mu_S) f_{M_S}(\mu_S) d\mu_S$$

### Value of information of the probabilistic analysis

- The value of information is the expected value of the CVI with respect to the possible design situations:

$$VI = \int_{M_S} CVI(\mu_S) f_{M_S}(\mu_S) d\mu_S$$

- Assuming a uniform distribution of  $M_S$  in the range [50kN,150kN], we obtain

$$VI = 1.4 \cdot 10^{-5}$$

- (The cost of the design/construction is in the order of  $10^{-3}$ )

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### When is a probabilistic analysis useful in practice?

(Some lessons to be learnt from the example)

- The analysis must be able to identify better solutions than a deterministic analysis
- The benefit of the better solution must be significantly higher than the cost of the analysis
- Useful for problems
  - In which the phenomena cannot be adequately modeled deterministically
    - In the presence of large uncertainties and/or non-linear effects
    - When dealing with collecting information
  - Where the potential benefit is huge (e.g. optimization of aircraft design)

24

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    - **When dealing with collecting information**
  - Where the potential benefit is huge (e.g. optimization of aircraft design)

26

### Value of information theory:

- Raiffa H., and R. Schlaifer (1961), *Applied Statistical Decision Theory*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Benjamin, J. R., and C. A. Cornell (1970), *Probability, statistics, and decision for civil engineers*, McGraw-Hill, New York.
- Straub, D. (2004), *Generic Approaches to Risk Based Inspection Planning for Steel Structures*, PhD thesis, ETH Zürich.

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## What are we doing?

### Decisions in complex systems under conditions of uncertainty

Aging of the infrastructure system:

- Monitoring & Inspection
- Maintenance
- Replacement / redesign



Natural hazards in the system „built environment“

- Prevention
- Emergency response
- Rehabilitation



Safety in the system „society“

- Target reliability
- Prescriptive limits
- Service life duration



## Three applications

- a. Avalanche risk analysis
- b. Dependence in earthquake fragility modelling
- c. Planning of inspections in offshore structures

## Avalanche risk assessment

- Where is it safe to build?
- Where should protection measures be implemented?
- When should roads be closed / buildings be evacuated?




Source: Kt. St. Gallen, Switzerland

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## Avalanche risk analysis

Avalanche model:




Straub D., Grêt-Regamey A. (2006). *Cold Regions Science and Technology*, 46(3), pp. 192-203.

31

## Avalanche risk analysis

- Parameter uncertainty
- E.g. friction parameter  $\mu$




Straub D., Grêt-Regamey A. (2006). *Cold Regions Science and Technology*, 46(3) , pp. 192-203.

32

## Avalanche risk analysis

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- E.g. friction parameter  $\mu$




Straub D., Grêt-Regamey A. (2006). *Cold Regions Science and Technology*, 46(3) , pp. 192-203.

33



## Avalanche risk analysis

- Observations available (here 50 years)




Straub D., Grêt-Regamey A. (2006). *Cold Regions Science and Technology*, 46(3) , pp. 192-203.

34

## Avalanche risk analysis

- Observations available (here 50 years)




Straub D., Grêt-Regamey A. (2006). *Cold Regions Science and Technology*, 46(3) , pp. 192-203.

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## Avalanche risk analysis – Bayesian updating


Friction parameter  $\mu$



Straub D., Grêt-Regamey A. (2006). *Cold Regions Science and Technology*, 46(3), pp. 192-203.

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
## Results in a probabilistic hazard map



Straub D., Grêt-Regamey A. (2006). *Cold Regions Science and Technology*, 46(3), pp. 192-203.

37

## Bayesian networks for avalanche risk assessment




Grêt-Regamey A., Straub D. (2006). *Natural Hazards and Earth System Sciences*, 6(6), pp. 911-926.

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## Implementation of the BN models in software is straightforward

- Implementation in a GIS environment
- Regional risk analysis



Grêt-Regamey A., Straub D. (2006). *Natural Hazards and Earth System Sciences*, 6(6), pp. 911-926.

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
## Modelling dependence in Earthquake fragility

(Statistical dependence is not captured by simple analyses)




## Bayesian network is a powerful modeling tool

- Tsunami warning example:




## Bayesian network in a nutshell

- Probabilistic models based on directed acyclic graphs
- Models the joint probability distribution of a set of variables



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## Bayesian network in a nutshell



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## Bayesian network in a nutshell


- Efficient factoring of the joint probability distribution into conditional (local) distributions given the parents

Here:

$$p(x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4) = p(x_1)p(x_2 | x_1)p(x_3 | x_1)p(x_4 | x_3)$$

General:

$$p(\mathbf{x}) = \prod_{i=1}^n p[x_i | pa(x_i)]$$



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
## Bayesian network in a nutshell

- Facilitates Bayesian updating when additional information (evidence) is available

E.g.:

$$p(x_3 | e_2) = \frac{p(e_2, x_3)}{p(e_2)}$$

$$= \frac{\sum_{x_1} p(x_1)p(e_2 | x_1)p(x_3 | x_1)}{\sum_{x_2} p(x_1)p(e_2 | x_1)}$$




Straub D., (2010). Lecture Notes in Engineering Risk Analysis. TU München

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
### Modelling with BN: System dependence through common factors

- Performance of an electrical substation during an EQ



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
### Can we observe the statistical dependence ?



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### When accounting for dependence, the system fragility strongly increases


- Redundant system: (parallel system with 5 components)



Straub D., Der Kiureghian A. (2008). *Structural Safety*, 30(4), pp. 320-366.

49


### EQ: Modeling systems and portfolio of structures



Straub D., Der Kiureghian A., (2010). *Journal of Engineering Mechanics*

50





## Risk-based inspection, maintenance, repair planning

- Structures deteriorate with time
- Deterioration is associated with large uncertainty
- Inspections are performed to reduce uncertainty
- The effect of inspections (and monitoring) can only be appraised probabilistically
  
- Applications:
  - Offshore structures subject to fatigue, corrosion, scour, ship impact, ...
  - Process systems subject to corrosion, erosion, SCC, etc...
  - Concrete structures (tunnels, bridges) subject to corrosion of the reinforcement
  - Aircraft structures

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## Optimizing inspection strategies


- Deterioration of offshore steel structures and pipelines
- Goal: Optimize sub-sea inspections






### Plan and optimize inspections

- We model the entire service life through event trees:




### Probabilistic deterioration modelling

- Fracture mechanics based probabilistic models of crack growth:




### Inspection modeling

- Inspections are also modeled qualitatively



### Probability of failure as a function of time and the influence of inspection




Straub D., Faber M.H. (2006). *Computer-Aided Civil and Infrastructure Engineering*, 21(3), pp. 179-192.

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
### Plan and optimize inspections

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


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**The maximum probability of failure determines the number of inspections**



**Optimization**



Straub D., Faber M.H. (2004). *J. of Offshore Mechanics and Arctic Engineering*, 126(3), pp. 265-271.


## IT implementation (iPlan)

The screenshot displays the iPlan software interface. At the top, there is a menu with options: 'Evaluate Inspection Plans', 'Plan options', 'Export inspection times', 'Computed ranges', and 'About...'. Below the menu is an 'Input sheet' section with fields for 'Project name', 'Platform installation year', 'Service life (Yrs)', 'Date', 'Prepared by', 'Checked by', and 'Approved by'. A table below lists various inspection cases with columns for Index, SN Curve, BS, CDV BS, A, AS, v, Thickness, DAB, Initiation Model, Life (Yrs), Inspection model, Threshold, RIF, Comments, Inspection Regard, Failure, and Interest. Below the table is a grid showing inspection points for different joints, with columns for 'Inspection points according to the user-defined frequency' and 'Inspection points according to the user-defined frequency'. A graph on the right shows 'Failure cost' vs 'Threshold, DAB'.

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## Structural importance

- How to determine redundancy?
- Deterministic approach is not sufficient (most components are not part of the dominant mechanism)
- (Simplified) probabilistic approach is needed



Straub D., Der Kiureghian A. (2011) *J. of Structural Engineering*, in print.


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### Optimize inspections in the structural systems

Single component: 1-5 Decision variables


Structure: 100 -1000 Decision variables

→ Heuristic method based on Value-of-Information



Straub D., Faber M.H. (2005). *Structural Safety*, 27(4), pp 335-355.


### DBN model for deterioration modeling



Straub D. (2009). *Journal of Engineering Mechanics*, 135(10), pp. 1089-1099






### Bayesian updating is robust AND efficient



Straub D. (2009). *Journal of Engineering Mechanics*, 135(10), pp. 1089-1099

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### Monitoring, Inspection and Maintenance for Concrete Structures



Straub D., et al. (2009). *Structure and Infrastructure Engineering*,

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**Therefore,**

... simplified (engineering) models are often sufficient for making optimal decisions

... but probabilistic analysis can provide useful insights and help making better decisions

... if we ensure that the benefit of the analysis outweighs the cost of the analysis

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**questions or comments?**

[straub@tum.de](mailto:straub@tum.de) / [www.era.bv.tum.de](http://www.era.bv.tum.de)



(D. Straub, July 2006)

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